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Parallels with the hate speech debate: The pros and cons of criminalising harmful 
securitising requests 
Rita Floyd
1
 
Abstract  
 
This article argues that public expressions of Islamophobia are best understood as securitising 
requests (i.e. calls on powerful figures/bodies to treat an issue in security mode so that 
extraordinary measures can be used to combat it), especially in those cases where Muslims 
are feared and disliked because of the perception that Islamic people are prone to violence 
and terrorism. This article argues that harmful and derogatory securitising requests targeting 
racial, ethnic, or religious minorities are on par with hate speech and it highlights the fact that 
many contemporary societies are now seeking legal protections against such security speech 
(expressed most notably in the desire to ban Islamophobia). It is from this perspective that 
this article poses an important research question: With a view to protecting those adversely 
affected, are legal protections against harmful and offensive securitising requests justified? 
The research question can be answered by drawing parallels to the existing hate speech 
debate in legal and political theory. The research reveals that, although the case against legal 
protections of harmful and defamatory security speech is ultimately more convincing, 
security speech alone can be so damaging that it should be informed by a number of ethical 
considerations. This article goes on to suggest three criteria for governing the ethics of 
requesting securitisation. As such this article fills a lacuna in the ‘positive/negative debate’ on 
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the ethics of security that has engaged with securitisation, but that has failed to consider the 
ethics of speaking security.  
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Introduction  
 
One consequence of the terrorist attacks in France, Brussels, Nice, and Germany in 2015 and 
2016 and the ongoing migrant crisis is the rise of populist right-wing movements and parties 
across the European continent. These groups have used the recent terrorist attacks to 
increasingly portray refugees and migrants (especially those of Muslim origin), as threats to 
security. In Germany, the leader of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland 
or AFD) Frauke Petry, for instance, requests that the German government secures  
Germany’s external border and has recommended that police and border guards should not 
rule out using firearms against illegal refugees if they do not respect the sovereignty of 
territorial borders (Zeit online, 2016). Her suggestion was backed by several high ranking 
AFD politicians, including, initially at least, Petry’s deputy Betrix von Storch and AFD MEP 
Marcus Pretzell (Stern, 2016). In a similar vein, after the initial (and later dismissed as false) 
speculation that the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks were refugees, and that 
“terrorist-refugees” were planning similar attacks in Munich. Lutz Bachman, leader of the 
PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), movement spoke (on 
Twitter) of “RefugeISIS” – not refugees (Harding, 2016). Likewise after the 2015 New 
Years’ eve events in Cologne, where approximately eighty women were sexually assaulted 
and/or mugged by up to a thousand young men with migrant backgrounds, and consecutive 
similar incidents in numerous public swimming pools and discotheques, Bachman (during a 
Facebook video post) was wearing a T-shirt with the slogan ‘Rapefugees not welcome’, 
seemingly declaring that all refugees are security threats to (German) women wherever they 
go (Die Welt, 2016). Bachman uses these crass expressions to underline PEGIDA’s request 
to German politicians that they secure borders and also German identity. In his own words: 
‘we [PEGIDA] demand here today, the creation of tougher immigration laws […] modelled 
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on the example of Canada or Switzerland. Deportation […] of Islamists and religious 
fanatics. [….]  More means for national security [Innere Sicherheit] […] to deal with new 
threats and challenges.’ (Bachman, 2015: 3, author translation)  
 The social and political construction – in language and lately also in visual depiction – 
of security threats has been a major concern for critical security studies for many years, 
evinced by the popularity of the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 
1998). In security studies, securitisation refers to the process by which an issue is removed 
from the ordinary democratic process and placed in the realm of the high politics of security, 
where conventional rules no longer apply and where extraordinary means may be used to 
address the issue (Buzan et al., 1998). For many scholars in the field, a case of successful 
securitisation consists of both a securitising move (a speech act that declares an entity as 
threatening) coupled with audience acceptance and palpable, usually extraordinary, security 
action (Buzan et al., 1998; Balzacq 2011); it does not refer to security measures that 
successfully avert a (perceived) threat. This article argues that Bachmann and Petry’s remarks 
are best understood as securitising requests, which is to say rhetorical moves aimed at 
persuading others (usually more powerful actors) to securitise, but that are not in and of 
themselves successful securitisation. The scholar Juha Vuori puts the logic of these sorts of 
securitising speech acts in more technical terms: 
 
The perlocutionary effect intended by [securitising requests], is to convince 
decision makers of the urgency of a threat, so that they will agree to raise the 
issue onto their agenda and effect the suggested measures. The illocutionary point 
[…] is directive, as the point is to try to get other people to do things, to get the 
hearer to carry out the course of action as represented by the propositional content 
e.g., to do X in order to repel threat Y. (2011:197) 
6 
 
 
The concept of securitising requests is important because it theoretically captures that 
securitising actors and their securitising moves do not exist in a political vacuum; rather they 
are influenced by a variety of actors including political advisors, opposition politicians, 
public intellectuals, newspaper editors and ordinary people. In other words, by actors whose 
intention in speaking security is not to announce, or seek legitimation for, the use of 
potentially extraordinary measures, but rather by actors who seek for others - more powerful 
actors- to securitise. In western liberal democracies, the media (specifically tabloid 
newspapers) serve as perhaps the most important entities in requesting securitisation. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the Daily Mail has for years requested the securitisation of 
migration (Squire, 2914:85; see also Said,1997), and as such influenced the BREXIT 
referendum; both the initial decision to hold a referendum as well as its outcome (cf. Vultee, 
2011; Croft, 2012:213). Although the logic of securitising requests is implicitly recognised by 
many scholars, it is common practice to refer to all instances of security speech as 
securitising moves. In other words, this paper is also an opportunity to clear up this 
conceptual oversight within securitisation studies. 
 While the concept of securitising requests is important in its own right (notably how 
precisely they influence securitising actors), this article is primarily concerned with ethics of 
speaking security. Securitising requests are important in this context. Not only do they 
highlight that by speaking security actors do distinct things (i.e. advance towards 
securitization or else request that other actors securitise), but also a focus on securitising 
requests enables a focus on a much larger group of people than attention to securitising actors 
and their securitising moves would allow. Nonetheless, since both securitising requests and 
securitising moves are forms of speaking security, any recommendations concerning the 
ethics of security speech following this analysis apply to both forms of security speech.  
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 In order to probe the ethics of speaking security this article starts by suggesting that 
securitising requests that are harmful and derogatory to racial, ethnic, or religious minorities 
are best understood as expressions tantamount to hate speech. Specifically, it is suggested 
that even in cases where the securitising request is not expressed using overtly offensive 
language; the identification of a minority as threatening simply because of who they are 
changes the minority’s standing in society and its effects are thus on a par with those of hate 
speech. 
 The equation of certain forms of security speech with hate speech is an important one. 
It draws attention to the fact that the existing hate speech debate, which is focused primarily 
on racism, downplays the concept that harmful speech can also be motivated by genuine 
fear.
2
 PEGIDA, for instance fears not only the threat posed from terrorist migrants/refugees 
but also the loss of German identity due to Islamisation (Bachmann, 2014:3). Hence the issue 
is not whether or not one has the right to express racist views, but instead, whether or not one 
may express fear even in the starkest possible terms. The link between security speech and 
hate speech also shows – as will be argued later – that harmful or derogatory security speech 
can cause retaliation by those offended, leading to real insecurity for societies in which the 
security speakers reside, while it can also stimulate hate crimes against minorities.  
 Most importantly – for the purposes of this article – the link between hate speech and 
some forms of security speech highlights the fact that legal protections are increasingly being 
sought against specific kinds of harmful and offensive securitising requests. For the most part 
this takes the form of politicians, organisations, and parties seeking the elevation of public 
expressions of Islamophobia
3
 to a criminal act. Before I can provide details, it is important to 
stress at this point that Islamophobia is ill defined and its meaning contested. (see, for 
                                                          
2
 In the context of the Muhammad Cartoon crisis, for example one popular argument was ‘that equating Islam 
with terrorism, violence, and death is […] racism’ (Bleich, 2006: 17).  
3
 It should be noted that not all expressions of anti-religious or blasphemous speech are hate speech. Tariq 
Modood suggests, for example, that the Danish newspaper’s intention in publishing the cartoon was to ‘bring 
Muslims in line’ and ‘to teach Muslims a lesson’ (2006,5; see also Carens (2006, p.34) 
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example, Allen, 2010; Sayyid and Vakil 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011) The Runneymede 
Report, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All from 1997, which has been instrumental in 
establishing the term in popular debate, defines Islamophobia as ‘the dread, hatred and 
hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and 
attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims’ (cited in Esposito, 
2011: xxiii). Strictly speaking, and as Chris Allen has convincingly argued, the conceptual 
‘phenomenon’ of Islamophobia4  denotes a hatred of Islam, while ‘expressions’ of 
Islamophobia ‘target religious or theological tenants of Islam’ (2010: 15,136).  For the most 
part, however, as Fred Halliday notes ‘expressions of Islamophobia are ‘anti-Muslim’ rather 
than ‘anti-Islamic’. The rhetoric is against people, not religion’ (cited in Allen, 2010:135), 
and the term Islamophobia etymologically incorrect. Consequently many analysts now think 
that what is generally referred to as Islamophobia is really racism, specifically (cultural) 
racism and racialisation (Meer and Modood, 2009; Meer, 2013). In addition to the fact that 
racism here is a problematic label, because ‘Muslims are not a ‘race’’ (Sayyid, 2010:13), an 
exclusive focus on racism obscures that –for all its problems- Islamophobia is also about fear. 
Attributing ‘fear’ and ‘phobia’, however, runs the risk of exonerates the person having the 
phobia because a phobia is an ‘illness’. (Sayyid, 2010: 12; Allen, 2010:136). Consequently, if 
as I do here, one wishes to highlight the fear element in Islamophobia, it is important to 
recognise that some of this might be caused by already existing racism, whilst racism itself 
might also be caused by fear.  
 With this in mind, let me now turn to the empirical examples demonstrating the 
increased desire to criminalise Islamophobia.  In the United Kingdom for example, the 
former Labour leader Ed Miliband – in the run up to the 2015 election – vowed to make 
Islamophobia illegal (Chapman, 2015). Meanwhile the Subcommittee on the Constitution and 
                                                          
4
 The threshold for what sort of thing counts as Islamophobia is different for different people because –it is 
widely acknowledged – that some people (mainly Muslim leaders) use it to knock down legitimate criticisms of 
Islam. (Allen, 2010:3)  
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Civil Justice within the United States House of Representatives is currently discussing a bill 
(Resolution 569, sponsored by Donald S. Beyer, Jr. of the Democratic party) that seeks to 
condemn ‘violence, bigotry, and hateful rhetoric against Muslims in the United States’ 
(https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-resolution/569/all-info), even though 
the U.S. constitution does not include hate speech protections. In Germany, section 130 of the 
German criminal Code ‘incitement to hatred’, which has its origin in Germany’s holocaust, 
has been amended twice in recent years and the law now prohibits ‘defaming segments of the 
population’ in speech and/or written materials. (German Criminal Code, 2015, §130)5 
Moreover, since the fatal shooting at the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the 
terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, non-state actors and individuals are urging the 
European Union (E.U.) to consider a Europe-wide ban on Islamophobia (Cerulus, 2016), as 
such events – like the London 7/7 bombings and similarly motivated terror attacks – have led 
to an increase in hate speech and hate crimes against Muslims.  Finally, in response to the 
Danish cartoon crisis, the United Nations General Assembly and its Human Rights 
Commission (UNHRC) passed a special resolution (on 26 March 2009) ‘condemning the 
“defamation of religion” as a human rights violation’ (Waldron, 2012: 124).  
In light of these empirical developments, the principal research question addressed in 
this article is this: With a view to protecting those adversely affected, are legal protections 
against specific kinds of harmful and offensive securitising requests justified? In order to 
answer the research question, this article draws parallels to the longstanding debate on hate 
speech protections in legal and political theory that arose in the context of such provisions in 
some states (most European states) but not others (notably the United States). The key issue 
                                                          
5
 Bachman was charged for ‘Volksverhetzung’ for ‘Rapefugees not welcome’ under this amended law in Mai 
2016. Petry,who had separately been reported to the authorities for firearm remark, were not followed up by the 
prosecutor in Mannheim in February 2016 as they were deemed in line with freedom of speech. Noteworthy is 
that Petry had done much to downplay and ameliorate the remark immediately after it was made. 
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is whether utterers of securitising requests should be allowed to ‘say’6 what they like in line 
with the right to free speech as is (most prominently) stated in the U.S. Constitution’s first 
amendment, or should the language and visuals of such securitising requests be curtailed in 
the way hate speech is in many European countries under various statutes, most commonly 
criminal codes (The Legal Project, 2015).  
Analysing security requests using this lens, reveals that security speech, as opposed to 
securitisation (here: successful/satisfied only after policy change has occurred), merely 
causes indirect harm (i.e. it leaves people feeling insecure and/or offended), while 
criminalisation is a proportionate response only to direct harm. Instead of advocating 
criminalisation, this article suggests that people ought to act in a socially and politically 
responsible manner and consequently, request securitisation ethically.   
This article sketches out three substantive criteria governing the ethics of requesting 
securitisation. The criteria advanced concern when to request securitisation and how to do so, 
and utilise existing research on ‘just securitisation’ (Floyd, 2011, 2015, 2016a). As such this 
article also seeks to be an important contribution to the ‘positive-negative’ debate on 
security/securitisation featured primarily in this journal (e.g. Floyd, 2007, Roe, 2008a, 2012 
Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012; Nyman, 2016), that has made much of the ethics of securitisation, 
but that hitherto failed to engage with the ethics of speaking security.  
 This article is structured as follows: Section I advances the concept of securitising 
requests as distinct from securitising moves and securitisation. Section II examines the case 
for advocating legal protections against harmful security speech utilising key insights from 
the hate speech debate found in legal and political theory. Section III outlines the case against 
such protections following the same method. Section IV sets forth three criteria governing the 
ethics of requesting securitisation. The conclusion summarises the argument advanced.  
                                                          
6
 In inverted commas here, because it technically also includes visuals.  
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I. What are securitising requests, how are they distinct from securitising moves 
and successful securitisation? 
 
The concept of securitisation originates from the work of the Copenhagen school, and 
specifically from that of one of its key members, Ole Wæver. After the Cold War, security 
policy both widened and deepened to include non-traditional security issues (e.g. 
environmental degradation, economic decline, migration) and referent objects of security 
policy other than the state (e.g. the environment, large banks) (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). 
Securitisation theory is able to capture analytically many of these new forms of security 
because it holds that security is a social and political construction, whereby issues become 
security threats only when they are considered to be that by relevant actors. In other words, it 
does not matter as such whether threats are objectively present (i.e. real).  
 Today, securitisation scholarship comprises a number of competing strands of 
securitisation, many of which have extended, refined, and clarified important aspects of the 
Copenhagen school’s original theory (see, for example, various in Balzacq, 2010; Williams, 
2003; and Hansen, 2000). In part, this theoretical work is driven by numerous inconsistencies 
and even contradictions in the Copenhagen school and/or Wæver’s work. For purposes of this 
article, it is important to note that there is some confusion over when securitisation 
‘succeeds’. The Copenhagen school appears to vacillate between tying the success of 
securitisation to the acceptance of the securitising move by an audience (for example, in the 
case of terrorism in the United Kingdom, when the general public has accepted that there is a 
terrorist threat) and the adoption of extraordinary measures and/or exceptional means (e.g. in 
the U.K. terrorism case when exceptional policy change occurred). Thus, on the one hand, 
they argue that securitisation is defined by ‘three components (or steps): existential threats, 
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emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules’ (Buzan et al., 
1998: 26), suggesting that extraordinary emergency measures are a necessary part of 
securitisation because rules are tantamount to ‘the normal way’ (ibid.). On the other hand, 
some passages of the seminal Security: A New Framework for Analysis suggest that 
securitisation is not decided by the use of extraordinary emergency measures in that same 
way. Instead, it argues that ‘we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency 
measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued…’ (ibid, 25); 
while in his single authored work, Wæver has repeatedly stated that ‘security is a speech act’ 
(Wæver, 1995).  
 As a consequence, some scholars have argued that if the linguistic speech act element, 
which is seemingly so central to original securitisation theory is taken seriously, then 
securitisation succeeds at the point of audience acceptance (for example, in the case of the 
securitisation of terrorism in the United Kingdom, securitisation succeeds when the general 
public accepts arguments put forward by the executive that there is a terrorist threat), and 
adoption of security measures does not come into it. Vuori, for example, writes that ‘security 
measures and their public securitisation are theoretically and at times even practically 
separate from each other, and thereby the application of security practices cannot be a 
sufficient criterion for the success of securitisation’ (Vuori, 2011: n98). In this vein he goes 
on to identify five types of ‘securitisation’: ‘(1) securitisation for raising an issue on the 
agenda, (2) securitisation for deterrence, (3) securitisation for legitimating past acts or for 
reproducing the security status of an issue, and (4) securitisation for control’ in addition to (5) 
‘securitisation for legitimating future acts’, which he attributes to Wæver (Vuori, 2008: 76). 
While Vuori seems to offer an elegant way out of the extensive debate that has ensued on 
whether or not security measures have to be exceptional to qualify as such, he overlooks that 
the Copenhagen school actually differentiates between securitisations that, we may say 
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(merely) exist (i.e. at the point of audience acceptance) and those that are successful (i.e. 
when, in addition to a relevant audience accepting a securitising request, security measures 
are adopted (Collins, 2005). In the case of U.K, terrorism, for example, this refers to the 
various new laws and police powers that came after. The reason why the school draws this 
distinction is that the former leaves one unable to sort the ‘important cases [of securitisation] 
from the less important ones’, because ‘many actions can take [the securitisation form] on a 
small scale’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 25).  
 In successful securitisation, then, at least for the Copenhagen school, securitisation 
and security measures are not separate processes at all, while the securitising move is a part 
of securitisation (successful or otherwise). Moreover, in successful securitisations, utterers of 
securitising moves and securitising actors are one and the same; indeed, securitising actors 
use language to – in Vuori’s terms – legitimate past or present action, to deter and to control, 
in ways that they then act on. Or, as I have argued elsewhere, bona fide securitising actors
7
 
use language either to warn off an “aggressor” (loosely: any agent at the source of a threat) or 
to promise protection to a referent object, or, in some cases, to do both (Floyd 2010, 2016b). 
This said, however, it is possible for other actors to speak security. Securitising actors 
(mostly) speak security in order to move or advance further in the direction of securitisation
8
, 
for example, by seeking acceptance from a designated audience for the necessary policy 
change (Roe, 2008). Other speakers of security, however, have neither the intention nor the 
capabilities to perform securitisation
9
. Instead, their purpose in speaking security is to request 
securitisation from another – usually more powerful – entity.10 Vuori refers to this as agenda-
                                                          
7
 Without going into excessive detail, it can be argued that securitisation scholarship ought to be more consistent 
with regards to terminology. It is misleading to label anyone who can utter a securitising speech act a 
securitising actor; instead the securitising actor is the one who either acts on the threat, or who is in a position of 
power to instruct others to act (but of course this holds only if one believes that successful securitisation 
involves policy change). 
8
 This qualifier mostly is necessary because securitising actors may not be truthful in their intention (cf Floyd 
2010)  
9
 Notably the Copenhagen school denies individual persons the capability to securitise outright. 
10
 Often but not necessarily the state  
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setting ‘securitisation’, but he is an exception, most other scholars indiscriminately use the 
term securitising move for all instances of speaking security, even if many, at least implicitly, 
recognise different logics informing security speech.
11
 It is reasonable to suggest that this 
conceptual oversight stems from the fact that for many scholars securitisation is 
satisfied/succeeds at the point of audience acceptance, regardless what follows on from this. 
If, however, we accept that successful securitisation involves policy change we can see that 
security speech serves different purposes. Securitising requests are separate from securitising 
moves because they are not uttered with the intention to legitimate, explain, or announce 
behaviour that will follow or that has gone before; instead, they are addressed to those in a 
position to conduct successful securitisation (e.g. to those that can enact policy change).
12
  
 It is difficult to say at what point a securitising request succeeds. At least three options 
present themselves, one is at the point of audience acceptance (i.e. when the request has been 
heard), arguably, however, the request is only granted when the designated securitising actor 
securitises, ergo securitising requests succeed at the point of securitisation. This logic, 
however, implies that only securitisation could remedy the problem identified in the initial 
securitising request, when it is possible that politicisation by the targeted actor might solve 
the problem. All the same, securitising requests and the conceptual separation off from 
securitising move, enables us to see that securitising moves can be influenced by these 
primary speech acts. Indeed, an important issue to observe is that while securitising actors 
                                                          
11
 Take for example, Claire (now Cai) Wilkinson’s work on securitisation in Kyrgyzstan prior to the ousting of 
President Akaev, which has done much to question the linear logic of process in securitisation. In the article, 
Wilkinson identifies ‘an initial securitizing move [….] at the local level by a number of candidates’ (2007:17) 
opposing the ruling government, aiming to organise the fractured opposition from its supporters. She further 
argues that this same initial securitising move together with counter-securitisation by the ruling government 
informed, indeed constructed the securitising actor, insofar as opposition leaders came together, and began 
echoing the initial securitizing move in their own rhetoric. (ibid: 19) Given this, Wilkinson observes: 
‘securitizing moves do not exist in isolation and may be simultaneously or subsequently linked to other 
securitizing moves that in total contribute to a securitization even if they are individually unsuccessful’ 
(2007:20). My point here is not that Wilkinson is incorrect, but simply that conceptually it makes more sense to 
describe Wilkinson’s initial securitising move as a securitising request, while the Opposition’s speech act was 
the securitizing move. 
12
 Who this is precisely varies for different theorists as it depends on one’s understanding of what sort of 
measures count as security measures (i.e. only extraordinary ones, or also more ordinary ones) (cf. Floyd 2016b) 
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need to be in a position of power to perform successful securitisation, anyone can utter a 
securitising request. That does not mean that everyone has access to the same platforms, or 
that everyone will be heard equally well, but simply that anyone who has a voice, or who can 
write, can in principle utter a securitising request (see van Mill, 2015). Anyone, that is, who 
possesses the physical capability to speak or write and is not silenced by structural 
constraints, including fear (see Hansen, 2000). This inclusiveness is the reason why this study 
on the ethics of speaking security commences from a focus on securitising requests as 
opposed to securitising moves by securitising actors. A holistic ethics of speaking security 
recognises that ordinary people can –in principle- facilitate securitisation. This said, any 
general rules regarding the ethics of speaking security generated by such a study also apply 
for securitising moves, as both securitising requests and securitising moves are forms of 
speaking security, neither do securitising actors have  special rights exempting them from all 
possible ethical standards. 
 This article now turns to the question of whether anything goes; i.e. should people be 
permitted to say or write what they want, or whether there should be protections, that is to say 
legislation that criminalises some kinds of securitising requests, notably those that target or 
single out racial, religious, or ethnic minorities?
13
  In other words, and given the empirical 
context against which this paper is set, are laws banning public expressions of Islamophobia 
justified?  
 Before this article dives into the discussion, a word on the meaning of criminalisation 
is necessary as there is some debate over the proportionality of certain punitive measures 
(especially non-pecuniary ones, such as imprisonment) for using denigrating speech (see, for 
example Baker and Zhao, 2013). Although this article does not start from the premise that 
securitising requests should be criminalised, it does not engage with the debate over what 
                                                          
13
 These speech acts are related to the criminalisation of minorities such as asylum seekers who have been 
identified not only as deviant or criminal but also as threats to the welfare state system in the UK and other 
European Union member states (see, for example, Banks, 2008; Huysmans 2000). 
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type of punitive measure is most appropriate (despite the fact that this could sway one’s 
thinking either way). Instead, the research starts from the lowest common denominator, 
namely, it considers the issue criminalised if it is written into criminal law regardless of the 
nature of the punitive measures adopted.   
 
II. The case for protections against harmful and offensive securitising requests  
 
Lest there be any doubt, it is important to be clear that when contemplating protections 
against security speech, this article is not concerned with legislating against all possible kinds 
of securitising speech acts but merely against a few select types. Freedom of speech is an 
essential value in liberal democracies; among many other things we can see the value of free 
speech on matters of security in the fact that everyone’s potential ability to put important 
issues on the agenda can have positive consequences. Thus, quite regardless of whether or not 
they result in successful securitisation, once phrased in security terms issues are often more 
likely to be heard, discussed, and acted on. As a case in point, consider the recent warnings 
by scientists that the widespread overuse of antibiotics (especially broad-spectrum ones) is 
considered a threat to global health security, public health and – in some countries (notably 
the United States) – to national security, because it leads to antibiotic and microbial 
resistance. In England these warnings have led to new guidelines for general medical 
practitioners concerning the frequency of prescriptions for antibiotics (NICE, 2015). So, in 
contemplating protections against securitising requests, this article is concerned only with a 
specific type of such requests, namely ones that single out or target racial, ethnic, or religious 
minorities. This article distinguishes between two different ways of doing so: (1) in plain, but 
not offensive securitising language; or (2) in an overtly offensive way, for example, by using 
dehumanising language (e.g. by comparing people to animals or diseases), or by employing 
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racially or culturally motivated slurs, including ridicule.
14
 An example of the first kind comes 
from the United Kingdom after the 7/7 London bombings, when Muslims were repeatedly 
identified as threatening because they were considered likely to become radicalised and 
engage in terrorist acts (see Pantakis and Pemberton, 2009; Croft, 2012). As Stuart Croft 
notes, the connections between ‘Islam and terrorism; sharia law and barbarism; sharia law, 
Islam and a threat to British values’ were primarily made by ‘powerful social actors [and] 
major media organizations’ (ibid, 212). For example, by polling Londoner’s comfort levels of 
sitting next to Muslims on public transport in case they might blow themselves up (Croft, 
2012: 213). Precisely through such means, the relevant actors requested government to get 
tough on Muslims, and for example, not build a new mosque near the 2012 Olympic Park, to 
disallow Muslim faith based schools, and instead to create a Britain based on British values 
(Croft, 2012). 
 An example of the second way of making security requests was mentioned with 
Bachman’s neologisms of “Rapefugees” and “RefugeISIS” in the introduction, and 
PEGIDA’s request to elected politicians to protect Germany and Germans from such threats. 
For a further example, consider the case of British media personality and Sun newspaper 
columnist Katie Hopkins who, during the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe, called illegal 
migrants ‘cockroaches’, ‘a plague of feral humans’, ‘spreading like norovirus on a cruise 
ship’, and requested that the British government and EU governments need to adopt 
Australian style security measures (Hopkins, 2015). In her own words:  
 
                                                          
14
 At this point it is worthwhile to remind ourselves that within securitisation theory it is not necessary that the 
word security is spoken. Wæver argues as follows: ‘In practice it is not necessary that the word security is 
spoken. There can be occasions where the word is used without this particular logic at play, and situations where 
it is metaphorically at play without being pronounced. We are dealing with a specific logic which usually 
appears under the name security, and this logic constitutes the core meaning of the concept security, a meaning 
which has been found through the study of actual discourse with the use of the word security, but in the further 
investigation, it is the specificity of the rhetorical structure which is the criterion – not the occurrence of a 
particular word.’ (Wæver 1995: 49 FN15) 
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It’s time to get Australian. Australians are like British people but with balls of 
steel, can-do brains, tiny hearts and whacking great gunships. Their approach 
to migrant boats is the sort of approach we need in the Med. They threaten 
them with violence until they bugger off, throwing cans of Castlemaine in an 
Aussie version of sharia stoning. And their approach is working. Migrant 
boats have halved in number since Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott got 
tough. We don’t need another rescue project. The now defunct £7million-a-
month Mare Nostrum — Italy’s navy search and rescue operation — was paid 
for (in part) by British taxpayers. And we don’t need a campaign from Save 
the Children to encourage more migrants to take the journey. What we need 
are gunships sending these boats back to their own country. (ibid, 2015) 
 
Although the boundaries between these two kinds of securitising requests are somewhat fluid 
– and clearly offence may be taken whatever the language – there are good analytical reasons 
for differentiating between the two. In particular, arguments for permitting securitising 
requests of the first kind do not preclude the need for banning securitising requests of the 
second kind. The primary reason for why one might want to prohibit both kinds of 
securitising requests is because of the probable consequences they may have for those that are 
the subject of security speech (i.e. the minorities in question). Thus, those identified as 
security threats (i.e. the relevant minority) might feel increasingly insecure in society, fearing 
vigilante attacks. In the UK, the Tell MAMA ( Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) project not 
only reports a ‘200 percent’ increase in anti-Muslim hate crime in 2015, but identifies ‘the 
misrepresentation of Muslims in Britain from certain media sources, politicians and public 
figures’ as a primary cause. (Tell MAMA, 2016:6 &11; see also Said, 1997). Although 
securitising requests do not necessarily lead to securitisation or hate crime, they can 
nevertheless instil change in society. In particular, the securitising requests that concern us 
here may render society as a whole more xenophobic and racist. Xenophobia and racism, in 
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turn, are harmful because they – to use Didier Bigo’s apt phrase – further ‘insecuritise’ 
minorities within society (Bigo, 2000).  
 The linkage between speech and insecurity is also stressed by Jeremy Waldron in his 
2012 book The Harm in Hate Speech on the need for protections against hate speech. 
Waldron argues that hate speech deprives people of security because it erodes what John 
Rawls referred to as ‘well-ordered societies’,15 by denying certain groups the fundamentals of 
such societies, namely ‘that all are equally human, and have the dignity of humanity, that all 
have an elementary entitlement to justice, and that all deserve protection from the most 
egregious forms of violence, exclusion, indignity, and subordination’ (Waldron, 2012: 82–
83). In Waldron’s view one important measure in assuring these fundamentals – and thus 
maintaining and even creating well-ordered societies – is by legislating against hate speech 
and defamation (ibid.: 81). ‘[H]ate speech laws aim not only to protect the public good of 
dignity-based assurance, but also to block the construction of this rival public good that the 
racists and Islamophobes are seeking to construct among themselves’ (ibid., 2012: 95).  
 All these are important points; they are relevant here because they show that 
securitising requests of the first kind resemble hate speech closely. Accordingly, while 
securitising requests of the first kind do not use offensive language, the use of the language of 
security (i.e. the identification of a minority as a ‘security threat’ because of who they are) 
alone is degrading. The use of security language changes, indeed reduces, the standing of 
affected minorities in society. Securitising requests of the first kind also reveal that ‘hate 
speech’ can be motivated by something other than hatred, or in other words, by something 
other than racism and xenophobia. Instead ‘hate speech’, or better ‘harmful speech’, can be 
motivated by fear, specifically fear of the minority posing a security risk. Of course, if such 
                                                          
15
 For Rawls a well-ordered society is ‘a formal ideal of a perfectly just society implicit in Rawls’s 
contractarianism. It is a society where (a) all citizens agree on the same conception of justice and this is public 
knowledge; moreover, (b) society enacts this conception in its laws and institutions; and (c) citizens have a 
sense of justice and willingness to comply with these terms’ (Freeman, 2007, 484). For discussion of how this 
idea [i.e. well ordered society] fits in within Rawls' wider commitments, see J. Floyd (2015). 
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fears are entirely unwarranted (i.e. because no credible empirical precedent involving the 
minority exists) it becomes inseparable from racism, while it is also the case that securitising 
requests motivated by fear often end up producing racism and xenophobia. Nevertheless we 
ought to recognise that expressions of harmful speech, including Islamophobia are based not 
exclusively on hatred but also on fear. 
 It should be obvious that if all of the above reasons on why there should be 
protections against harmful securitising speech hold for securitising requests of the first kind, 
then they also hold for securitising requests of the second kind, as the latter are a more 
serious case of the former. That said, there are additional reasons for curtailing securitising 
requests that use offensive language when they single out or target racial, ethnic, or religious 
minorities. Yet, it is not always easy to know when something is offensive. In hate speech 
legislation, offending is seen as a step down from instilling hate and is not generally 
covered.
16
 One reason for this is the extremely subjective nature of offence. Specifically, 
thresholds for when offence is taken differ widely with age, culture, religion and also with 
who the speaker is. Plus, it is possible to offend without intending to do so.  For example, the 
Caucasian Oscar-nominated actor Benedict Cumberbatch had to apologise profusely for 
causing offence when he referred to black actors as ‘coloured’ in an interview with a U.S. 
broadcaster (Bakare, 2015). The comments were made in the context of Cumberbatch 
bemoaning the absence of equal opportunities in the industry.  
 With offence hard to capture, it is important to recognize that it might be extremely 
difficult to provide legislation criminalising securitising requests that use offensive 
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 However many states’ efforts to widen hate speech legislation means that legislation increasingly includes 
mere offending, especially as states are trying to regulate trolling and expressions of hate speech in social media. 
See for example the above mentioned section 130 of the German criminal Code, or  Section 127 of the 
Communications Act 2003 in England  
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language.
17
 However, in the interest of (national) security, the case for criminalising these is 
strong, because they are doubly dangerous. Not only do they ‘insecuritise’ minorities, erode 
well-ordered society and potentially lead to hate crime, they also run the risk of rendering the 
general population insecure because offence (especially against religious beliefs) might cause 
retaliation. Conversely, if offending in this way is punishable by law, the offence is less likely 
to cause retaliation and/or to occur in the first place.  
 In recent years we have seen revenge attacks in response to securitising requests of 
the second kind (i.e. those that use offensive language or visuals) in the aftermath of the so-
called Muhammad cartoon crisis. Lene Hansen has argued that especially in the age of the 
internet, images are prolific and influential and ought to be included into a theory of 
securitisation (Hansen, 2011a). This is because ‘to constitute something as a matter of 
security is to make a political intervention’ (ibid., 53) and images (especially iconic images) 
can have political implications (Hansen, 2015, see also Croft, 2012: 104-6). This political 
intervention can take a number of forms. Hansen suggests that images can very readily depict 
‘the Other as demonic, barbaric, evil, and menacing’ while they  can also be used to belittle 
the Other ‘constituting him/her/it as insignificant, weak, small, cowardly, backward, or 
feminine, as someone “to be laughed at rather than hated or feared”’ (Hansen, 2011a: 59). ‘A 
depiction through demonization’, Hansen further argues, ‘constitutes a threat to be conquered 
while a strategy of belittling makes the threat manageable’ (ibid.). Either way, images, like 
words, may thus be utilised to call on powerful actors to securitise any given issue or 
(perceived) threat.  
 Hansen nevertheless holds that images ‘securitise’ usually in conjunction with spoken 
or written words that give a specific meaning to the image. Words are necessary because the 
image itself can convey multiple meanings. For example, ‘the lit turban-bomb, the bushy 
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 Notably some courts (specifically U.S. courts) arbitrate successfully on similar matters with high subjectivity, 
including by using legal tests for establishing what is pornography or the way some courts apply the “reasonable 
person” standard.  
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eyebrows, and the piercing eyes [of Kurt Westergaard’s (in)famous bomb-turban cartoon] 
evoke on the one hand a violent, possibly terrorist-suicidal subject; on the other this is a 
disembodied face, devoid of spatial and temporal location with no other subjects present’ 
(ibid., 63). She further argues, however, that clear meaning was given to the cartoons, which 
were obviously belittling, in the context of several accompanying editorials in Danish 
newspapers which identified the West as existentially threatened ‘from “Muslim” imams as 
well as from the wider “Islamic worldview”’ and [requested that] “Western society” and 
“Muslims” deter  this threat (Hansen, 2011b: 364). One way of resisting the narrative 
suggested in securitising requests is through counter-securitisation.
18
  
 Many Muslims were greatly offended by the cartoons and how they were being 
contextualised in Denmark and abroad with many media outlets republishing the cartoons. 
Their publication led to widespread violent protests (including in Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
North Africa), terrorist attacks (besides Charlie Hebdo also deadly shootings in Copenhagen 
in February 2015) and arguably a deepening (or indeed the initial creation) of a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ (Burke et al, 2006). Given the climate in which these cartoons were published 
(i.e. during the global war on terror) these consequences were not only probable but also 
foreseeable. Since individual newspapers clearly do not have that foresight and may very well 
be motivated by agendas (especially financial or political) other than one of greater overall 
security, it is reasonable to suggest that legislators should intervene and curtail the spreading 
of unnecessarily offensive securitising requests (in this case offensive images accompanied 
by offensive editorials) by criminalising such security speech. This suggestion is made on the 
basis of empirical evidence. Researchers have found that civil hate speech protections have a 
positive effect on ‘mediated outlets’ because staff are trained to be sensitive to hate speech 
                                                          
18
 In securitisation studies resistance is usually considered a form of desecuritisation (i.e. the act of resisting 
securitisation) (see, for example, Vuori, 2014), but there is no reason why resistance cannot also take the form 
of ‘counter-securitisation’ (i.e. resisting someone else’s security speech through one’s own security speech and 
action ), or indeed we can say that securitisation is motivated by wishing to resist a (perceived) threat. 
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legislation (Gelber and McNamara, 2015: 649). Indeed, the effects of what Gelber and 
McNamara call ‘the “laws” educative role’ (ibid, 650) is such that it is reasonable to suggest 
that had unduly offensive securitising requests been controlled by legislation (i.e. 
criminalised), it is a serious possibility that the massacre at the French satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in which twelve staff were killed by two Islamist gunmen might have been 
avoided. At a minimum, it is likely that the magazine would have abstained from publishing 
the images and the accompanying editorial. 
 
III. The case against protections of securitising requests whatever their nature 
 
The case against protections of any kind of securitising request starts from the assumption 
that free speech is a fundamental value of liberal democratic societies that ought not to be 
curtailed. Most advocates of free speech believe that hate speech legislation is unwarranted 
and that the only things that ought to be curtailed are pornography involving minors and 
extreme libel (see Waldron, 2012: 145). When it comes to security we can see the value of 
free speech quite clearly; thus in Western liberal democracies anyone is allowed to criticise 
their government for making people (feel) insecure, whether by misguided foreign policy, 
exaggerating the terror threat, monitoring populations through technologies including 
surveillance, or for not providing adequate military hardware for armed forces in combat 
situations. If we start to curtail some kinds of securitising requests by legislation then where 
does it stop? In times of crisis, when unanimity is key and often assured (Neal, 2012), might 
not the legislator be tempted to prohibit criticism of executives’ policies or indeed 
‘desecuritising requests’? In the United States, for example, criticism of the official 
governmental line in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was considered deeply 
unpatriotic (Evangelista, 2008: 60; Croft, 2006). At the time, the prevailing mood was 
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captured in George W. Bush’s often used phrase ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists’ (Bush, 2001), while at the same time, the PATRIOT Act and subsequent counter-
terrorist activities, which allowed the extended surveillance of suspected terrorists by the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security were widely regarded as reminiscent of 
McCarthyism (Edwards, 2015: 409). 
 A second deontological argument against protections is that securitisation theory tells 
us that insecurity is a matter of perception and politics (Gad and Petersen, 2011; Taureck, 
2006). Surely if one is scared of something or someone, one should have the right to say it, 
regardless of the consequences. This is particularly important in light of the fact that fear can 
be a direct result of governmental policy. For example, one may believe that the U.K. 
government has with its counter-terrorist policies created a ‘suspect Muslim community’ 
(Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), and thus driven hitherto moderate Muslims into 
radicalisation with the result that they now pose a concrete threat to oneself and other British 
people. The right to voice one’s opinion in this case is essentially the late Ronald Dworkin’s, 
(2009) legitimacy argument in favour of free speech. Much simplified, he argues that in a 
democracy everyone is forced to live by some laws that they do not agree with (he has in 
mind laws about positive discrimination), because of the consequences of those laws (i.e. 
admittance to jobs, etc.); if one is not allowed to voice one’s discontent against the law in 
question, then the legislator is illegitimate because – in a democracy – legitimacy arises from 
everyone having a voice. In his own words: 
 
Fair democracy requires … that each citizen have not just a vote but a voice: a 
majority decision is not fair unless everyone has had a fair opportunity to 
express his or her attitudes or opinions or fears or tastes or presuppositions or 
prejudices or ideals, not just in the hope of influencing others (though that 
hope is crucially important), but also just to confirm his or her standing as a 
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responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action. 
(Dworkin cited in Waldron, 2012: 175, author emphases) 
 
A third argument against protections of securitising requests – whatever their nature – is that 
securitising requests can fail out in the open.
19
 This is essentially an extrapolation of the 
argument by many opponents of hate speech protections that opinions are better out in the 
open than driven underground (Barendt, 2005a, 2005b). Allowing securitising requests to fail 
democratically would render a stronger well-ordered society. Notably, historical evidence 
suggests that a society whose citizens live according to governing principles that they believe 
in is bound to be stronger than one where universal values are enforced top-down by the 
legislator (cf. Buzan, 2004: 253). Indeed, criminalisation of securitising requests can create 
further resentment against the feared group(s). Instead of being addressed, the issue could 
then be driven underground where it might gain momentum, perhaps in part, out of 
resentment against the legislator (cf. Barendt, 2005b). 
 Finally, it is not clear in what sense securitising requests cause factual, direct harm. In 
a 2013 critical reply to Waldron’s The Harm in Hate Speech, Dennis Baker and Lucy Zhao 
argue that Waldron fails to distinguish between theoretical harm and factual harm. They 
argue that no factual harm is caused when putative victims simply feel that their dignity is 
compromised by denigrating speech (Baker and Zhao, 2013: 625, 637). They also remind us 
of what precisely states seek to prevent by means of hate speech legislation: 
 
Incitement type offenses aim to prevent the harmful riot (as an example) from 
eventuating and thus criminalize the expression (means) used to encourage 
others to consummate the offense of rioting. D is not punished for the 
expression in itself, but for using expression to try to encourage a harmful riot. 
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 Any definition of failure depends, of course, on one’s definition of success. Given the difficulties with that 
(cf.p.14), at a minimum level, however, we can perhaps say securitising requests fail when they are not picked –
up by the designated securitising actor 
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The harm that the state is trying to prevent with such offenses is the riot, rather 
than the speech in itself. (Baker and Zhao, 2013, 626) 
 
In this context, it is important to recall that unlike with straight forward hate speech, the 
utterer of the securitising requests does not want the ‘audience’ to do abhorrent and harmful 
things (i.e. commit hate crimes). Instead they want the securitising actor (i.e. the audience of 
the securitising request) to securitise the issue; and it is conceivable that – sometimes at least 
– abhorrent language is used primarily to stress the urgency of the matter and to get a 
powerful audience’s attention. In short, even overtly offensive securitising requests are not 
incitement to hatred, but rather requests for protection of valued referent objects driven by 
fear and hatred. This is important because it means that criminalisation is a disproportionate 
response because securitising requests (i.e. security speech) does not in fact cause factual or 
direct harm, but merely theoretical or indirect harm, insofar as targeted groups perceive 
greater levels of insecurity or feel offended. Direct, factual harm is caused only when 
someone in the position to securitise follows up on the requests and securitises the issue. For 
example, it is well established that in the United Kingdom Muslims were not only 
disproportionally affected by new terror legislation following the 7/7 bombing, but some of 
the measures (notably detention without trial) were directly harmful (e.g. Pantakis and 
Pemberton, 2009; Croft, 2012). Arguably, however, the use of security measures that are 
directly harmful is unjustifiable only if the securitisation itself is unjust
20
. At most, we can 
thus debate whether unjust securitisation can or ought to be criminalised, while the 
criminalisation of securitising requests is always unjustified. 
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 With the ethics of security and securitisation only just emerging in security studies (see Nyman and Burke, 
2016; Browning and McDonald, 2013), the precise meaning of unjust securitisation is not set in stone. Judging 
by the well-established literature on the morality of war (security’s closest relative), however, it is to be 
expected that just securitisation will have to involve considerations concerning proportionality, expected 
outcome, right intention and so on (Floyd: 2011, 2015, 2016a). 
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 Direct harm is also caused when a counter-securitisation is launched (as is the case 
with revenge attacks), but these clearly are an unintended consequence of the initial 
securitising request and most certainly not the intention of those requesting securitisation. 
Finally, direct harm is caused when vigilante commit hate crime against minorities informed 
by the securitising request.  
 It is one thing to argue that we ought to be allowed to say what we want, but may we 
also say it in the way we want? In other words what possible arguments are there for not 
restricting securitising requests of the second kind (those that are overtly offensive to 
minorities)? Existing legislation on hate speech covers some but not all overtly offensive acts 
possible here, in spite of the fact that this legislation is growing. But there are problems with 
legislating against overtly offensive securitising requests. Waldron, for one, argues that 
‘offense is not a proper object of legislative concern … [unlike dignity it is not about] 
objective or social aspects of a person’s standing in society’ but rather, it is about ‘subjective 
aspects of feeling, including hurt, shock, and anger’ (Waldron, 2012: 103, 106). At least three 
more arguments are relevant in this context, and all of them can be exemplified using the 
Charlie Hebdo case. The first is advanced as part of Charlie Hebdo’s editorial supporting 
publication of the cartoons, where it was argued that ‘the suggestion that you can laugh at 
everything, except certain aspects of Islam, because Muslims are much more prickly than the 
rest of the population – what is that, if not discrimination?’ (cited in BBC News, 2015). In 
other words, all faiths are equally ridiculous, fanciful and/or sacred, and if we are allowed to 
laugh at one of them, then by implication, we should be allowed to laugh at all of them (cf. R. 
Hansen, 2006: 12). 
 Second, peace researchers have suggested that humour can not only be a conflict 
generator, but also a tool for peacebuilding (Zelizer, 2010). Recall Lene Hansen’s point that 
the bomb-turban cartoon can be interpreted in different ways. Specifically, ‘the cartoon relies 
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upon a generic image of “the non-Western” as looking wilder, more rural, and less modern 
than a Western subject, yet with the possible exception of the turban, the imagery is not 
distinctly Muslim’ (Hansen, 2012: 63). Precisely because it is not distinctly Muslim, it could 
have presented those Muslims who consider the views of radicalised ‘Islamists’ un-Islamic 
with a means to distance themselves from such people, and to strengthen a joint French, 
Danish, etc. identity with their fellow countrymen and women. Such togetherness and unity 
could help counteract radicalisation with fewer young Muslims being caught between 
different worlds. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, counter-terrorism police are already 
working together with a Muslim comedian to counter-act radicalisation is secondary schools 
(Talwar, 2015). 
Finally, it is fairly safe to assume that individuals who act in the abhorrent way that 
Saїd and Chérif Kouachi (the Charlie Hebdo gunmen) did in response to offensive and 
belittling cartoons would have done so anyway in revenge against foreign policy choices etc. 
In the aftermath of the shooting it emerged that both individuals had become radicalised over 
a long period of time and one had previously been arrested on his way abroad to commit 
jihad; in other words, the ideological commitment was already there, the cartoons may have 
simply been the catalyst.  
 
IV.  Requesting securitisation ethically   
 
While the arguments on both sides are strong, from the point of view of securitisation, one of 
them carries more weight than the others because it goes right to the heart of the difference 
between simply speaking security and securitisation proper (i.e. security speech plus policy 
change). This is the argument that legal protections against harmful and derogatory security 
speech are a disproportionate response because the harm caused by such speech acts is 
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indirect/theoretical, and accordingly, that only direct, factual harm, as that caused by 
securitisation may warrant criminalisation.
21
  Yet, even if criminalising harmful securitising 
requests (including banning expressions of Islamophobia) is to be rejected on the grounds of 
proportionality, the analysis also suggests that mere security speech is or should not be free 
from ethical considerations. Not only because indirect harm is hurtful to the minorities in 
question, but also because it detracts from the fundamentals of a well-ordered society.  
 Given that everyone can speak security by requesting securitisation, we can say that 
principles governing the ethics of speaking security ethically apply to all persons, and not 
only to securitising actors when uttering securitising moves. The existing and growing 
literature on ethics and security/securitisation, sometimes known as the ‘positive/negative 
debate on security’, has so far failed to engage with the ethics of security speech. Ethical 
concerns over securitisation and hence the need for moral criteria governing securitisation 
arises largely from the ill-effects of the exceptional measures legitimised by securitisation 
(Floyd, 2011, 2016a). Or, in other words, the very issue of its ethics has arisen because 
securitisation causes direct harm and causing harm can supposedly only be justified if 
securitisation itself is just. Since securitisation theory is very much concerned with security 
speech, a theory of just securitisation is incomplete without considering also the ethics of 
security speech. An ethics of speaking security must start from the concept of securitising 
requests not only because securitising requests are much more inclusive than securitising 
moves, but also because securitising requests can influence securitising moves. This article 
proposes that two issues are important in this regard: when to request security and how to 
request security. In the following each is addressed in turn. 
 By drawing on the ‘just war’ tradition, I have argued elsewhere that the single most 
important criterion for just securitisation is the presence of a just cause, because exceptional 
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 This is not to suggest that unjust securitisation ought to be criminalised, merely that it could – in certain 
circumstances- be warranted   
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measures can only be justified in the presence of a real threat (Floyd, 2011).
22
 Given that the 
use of exceptional measures is the objective of those requesting securitisation, we can 
reasonably require for persons requesting securitization to be as certain as they can be that the 
issue (including the racial, ethnic, religious minority) presents a real threat before they utter 
security speech. The connection between objectively present or real threats and ethics is made 
by a number of scholars writing on ethics and security, albeit usually not from the perspective 
of securitisation (e.g. Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald, 2014 and various in Nyman and 
Burke, 2016). Indeed the invocation of real threats seems antithetical to the very idea of 
security as a social and political construction. This said, it needs to be remembered that the 
Copenhagen school, or at least Ole Wæver, does not hold that there are no such thing as 
objective existential threats, but rather that ‘security threats’ are socially and politically 
constructed. In his own words: ‘Lots of real threats exist, but they do not come with the 
security label attached’ (Wæver, 2011: 472). With some notable exceptions (Balzacq, 2010), 
securitisation scholars tend to be only interested in how issues achieve security threat status; 
and some might deny the possibility of ascertaining threat status as it is impossible to know 
all the morally relevant facts about a situation. This assumption is not disputed here. 
Consequently, instead of requiring that relevant persons need to establish the objective 
presence of threats in a ‘fact-relative sense’ (Parfit, 2011: 162), a judgement about the status 
of a threat needs to be true in an evidence-relative sense. Evidence-relativity ‘refers to the 
situation when the available evidence suggests decisive reasons that the beliefs people hold 
about a given situation are true’ (ibid.). In practice this means that persons intent on 
requesting securitisation must aim to gather evidence of the threat level of someone/-thing 
approximating the actual facts before requesting securitisation. In the case of the suspected 
link between refugees and migrants and terrorism, for example, the PEGIDA leadership 
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 Wæver (2009) reasons along similar lines when he argues that securitisation requires existential threats. 
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should have checked the facts on migrant and refugee involvement in the Paris terror attacks, 
which was dismissed as false soon after the attacks. 
  Persons requesting securitisation intent to bring about securitising moves and 
securitisation. If this is so, then requesting securitisation ethically also means that persons 
requesting securitisation need to be as sure as they can be that the issue in question is ideally 
treated as a matter of security and not simply as a political matter. This requires them not 
only to anticipate the probable consequences of an ensuing successful securitisation, but to 
measure – as best as possible - these consequences against not securitising. The securitisation 
of terrorism and the resulting treatment of Muslims in the United Kingdom after the 7/7 
bombings, for example, led to an increase in home-grown radicalisation and recently the 
issue of the return of foreign fighters, throwing doubt onto the initial decision to securitise or 
– at least –  about the way it was done (Fierke, 2007). Importantly, even if there is a real 
threat, securitisation as opposed to politicisation is not always the best solution. 
 Moving on to the issue of how to request security ethically, it is helpful to consider 
Tariq Modood’s argument (made in the context of the Muhammad cartoon): ‘One relies on 
the sensitivity and responsibility of individuals and institutions to refrain from what is legal 
but unacceptable. Where these qualities are missing one relies on public debate and censure 
to provide standards and restraints’ (2006:6).  That Modood is correct in identifying, what we 
might call ‘a collective standard of communication’ is apparent from the fact that the above 
cited securitising requests by a Petry, Bachmann, and Hopkins require little in the way of 
explanation as being unacceptable; instead they rather speak for themselves. A decisive 
feature about securitisation is that it legitimises the use of exceptional measures, yet the 
examples suggest that requesting securitisation ethically means to observe the collective 
standard of communication. In other words, even a real threat does not legitimise 
exceptionally derogatory and defamatory speech. 
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 Moreover, the examples discussed above also show that in the interest of peace and 
security it is not always wise to say or publish anything and everything at all times. The 
Muhammad cartoon crisis, for example, was made worse by newspaper and magazine 
editors’ decision to exacerbate a sensitive issue by re-publishing the initial offending cartoons 
and by commissioning new, equally offensive ones. Waldron has a valid point when he 
argues: ‘Often, the best that [newspaper editors] could say for [re-publishing the cartoons] 
was that they were upholding their right to publish them. But a right does not give a right-
bearer a reason to exercise the right one way or another’ (Waldron, 2012: 126). However, 
given that many politicians and security organisations (the police, border agencies, etc.) 
benefit from a politics of fear that often involves singling out minorities, it must be 
acknowledged that self-censorship faces many obstacles (see, for example, Wacquant, 2014; 
Huysmans, 2006; Simon 2001).  
 Although the principles of the ethics of speaking security have here been developed in 
the context of securitising requests, it goes without saying that these apply also to securitising 
actors and their securitising moves. There is simply no reason why securitising actors should 
be exempt from these basic rules of engagement. Rules that, if obeyed, could reduce the level 
of harm caused in society considerably. 
 In summary, we can now say that just security speech has three components: 1) there 
is a threat that is real in an evidence-relative sense and 2) when securitisation is likely to be a 
better solution than politicisation, whereby ‘better’ is measured in terms of the least amount 
of overall greater insecurity caused. Finally, when speaking security 3) observe existing 
collective standard of communication, and – in the interest of peace and security –  exercise a 
degree of self-censorship. 
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Conclusion  
In contemporary Europe and elsewhere there is a discernible trend towards either tightening 
existing hate speech legislation or introducing new legislation in order to curtail the 
defamation of migrants and refugees as security threats and/or terrorists. For the time being, 
this is most clearly expressed by an increased willingness to ban Islamophobia. In the context 
of these developments, this article has critically engaged with the justifiability of 
criminalising requests to securitise that are harmful or derogatory to racial, ethnic, or 
religious minorities in order to protect those adversely affected. It has done so by drawing 
parallels to the existing hate speech debate in legal and political theory. As part of the 
analysis offered, this paper developed the novel analytical concept securitising requests, 
which captures security speech uttered not by securitising actors intent on securitisation, but 
rather security speech expressed by ordinary people intent on persuading powerful actors to 
securitise.  
 It was argued that even securitising requests that do not use overtly offensive 
language, but simply single out racial, ethnic, or religious minorities as security threats are 
tantamount to expressions of hate speech because the link to security due to who these groups 
are is in and of itself degrading. It was further argued that the recognition of securitising 
requests as expressions of hate speech reveals the important insight that harmful speech is 
based not only on hate, but also on fear. Conceived as such – from the point of view of 
security – the case against protections is more convincing. In part because one positive of 
liberal democracies is that citizens are allowed to express their security fears, including of 
government policy. 
 The analysis further revealed that, although criminalising harmful and offensive 
securitising speech can lead to an increase in security for affected groups and that it can pre-
empt violent counter-securitisation, punitive measures are a disproportionate response 
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because even offensive and derogatory security speech causes only indirect harm (i.e. they 
leave members of minorities feel insecure, or they offend members of religious etc. groups). 
This is in line with the rationale behind many state’s longstanding hate speech legislation 
which seeks to prevent primarily the consequences of hate speech (i.e. hate crime, terrorism), 
and which recognises the adverse consequences for democratic process if offensive speech is 
criminalised. On the basis of these arguments this article concluded that laws banning public 
expressions of Islamophobia - at least in those cases where Muslims are feared and disliked  
because of the perception that Islamic people are prone to violence and terrorism, as well as 
similar securitising requests - are not justified.  
 Far from negating the significance of indirect harm, however, this article went on to 
suggest that all persons ought to request security ethically. This article then outlined where 
the focus should be: when to request security and how to do so. In so doing, this article filled 
a lacuna in the research on ethics and securitisation, which has hitherto failed to engage with 
the ethics of speaking security.  
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